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Securities Malfeasance in Japan: The
Need for an Independent Organization to
Monitor Insider Trading, Price
Manipulation, and Loss Compensation
By WATARU HORIGUCHI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Japanese stock market transactions have traditionally been replete
with illegal and unfair practices such as insider trading and price manip-
ulation. Recently, loss compensation has also become a problem. When
the Japanese stock market crashed and the bubble economy burst ap-
proximately two years ago, many large institutional investors sustained
heavy losses and demanded illegal loss compensation from securities
companies. Anxious not to lose major clients, many securities companies
complied with the demands of the institutional investors. The payment
of loss compensation created a heated political controversy in Japan, be-
cause while many institutional investors were absolved of personal re-
sponsibility for their losses, individual investors had to absorb the losses
they had suffered in the stock market crash. A 1990 amendment to the
Securities and Exchange Law will alleviate the problem of loss compen-
sation for the time being. However, the amendment was hastily made,
and more comprehensive changes to the Securities and Exchange Law
are necessary to prevent the recurrence of loss compensation in the fu-
ture. Furthermore, the problem of loss compensation has been exacer-
bated by the manner in which the Ministry of Finance supervises
securities firms and the stock market. The Ministry of Finance maintains
too close a relationship with many securities firms to regulate the prob-
lem of loss compensation effectively.
This Article discusses Japanese regulation of insider trading, prohi-
bition of price manipulation, and prohibition of loss compensation. It
recommends methods to supervise the stock market and to eliminate
malfeasance in securities dealing.
* Professor of Economics, Nihon University
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
II. REGULATION OF INSIDER 'rADING
In Japan, regulations contained in Securities and Exchange Law sec-
tion 189 prohibit insider trading, stipulating that officers or principal
shareholders must forfeit to the company any profits from the short term
trading of their company's shares. Insider trading is also prohibited by
Securities and Exchange Law section 58(1), which is identical to Ameri-
can Securities and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. How-
ever, section 58(1) is difficult to apply to Japanese ins:ider trading because
of a difference between the U.S. and Japanese codes of procedure. Ac-
cordingly, insider trading has long been a problem in Japan, and it has
not been effectively regulated. Therefore, various other countries have
criticized the Japanese stock exchange as being a. hotbed of insider
trading.
The Tateho Kagaku Kogyo incident brought the need to regulate
Japanese insider trading to the forefront and led to an amendment to the
Securities and Exchange Law in 1988. As amended, the Securities and
Exchange Law requires officers and principal shareholders to report trad-
ing of their own company's stock (section 188), provides the rules regard-
ing surrender of profits from short term trading (section 189), prohibits
trading by persons related to public buyers (section 190(2) and section
190(3)), and establishes new penal regulations. However, the conditions
required to establish a violation of the amended Securities and Exchange
Law are too particular, and the penalties (under 6 months imprisonment
or fines of under Y500,000) are too light. It is evident that these regula-
tions are insufficient and too lenient to eradicate the problem of insider
trading.
Only two instances of insider trading in Japan have as yet been ex-
posed. The Nisshin Kisen K.K. (now Shiikomu) was one such incident.
In 1989, Nisshin Kisen purchased the Sidney Regent Hotel in Australia.
Capital was to be raised by an allocation of new shares to a third party,
and a related source investigated the potential success of a new stock
subscription. President "A" of a finance company, who knew of the allo-
cation, used his knowledge of a capital increase and of the names of con-
tacts to purchase 7,000 shares of Nisshin Kisen stock. After an
investigation, the Ministry of Finance and the Tokyo Stock Exchange
rendered a verdict of "innocent." However, the Metropolitan Police
Agency made a separate investigation and filed a complaint on April 22,
1990. The Tokyo prosecutor's office brought a summary indictment in
the Tokyo Summary Court on September 26. The Tokyo Summary
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Court handed down a summary order of a Y200,000 fine on the same
day.
"A" was indicted under section 190(2), which prohibits the trading
of listed stocks by any person knowing important facts about the affairs
of a company prior to the public announcement of a company's decision
to issue new shares. Ordinarily, the board of directors decides whether
to issue new stock. However, in this case only two or three people, in-
cluding the president of Nisshin Kisen, made a third party allotment.
"A" purchased shares on June 15, prior to the board of directors' June
16 decision. Consequently, it became suspected that "A" had prior
knowledge of important facts.'
The second instance of insider trading involved Makurosu and was
prosecuted by the Ministry of Finance on April 26, 1991 in Tokyo Court.
Makurosu, an industrial machine manufacturer listed on the Touhsou
Second, made a fictitious transaction of Y4 billion. The company dis-
closed the fictitious transaction at the end of September 1990, but "B,"
the managing director, had sold off 22,000 shares in the company under
his own and his wife's names on September 3 and 4, thus avoiding losses
due to the drop in value of the stocks. The stock values of the company
were Y1400 per share at the time of the sale, but dropped to Y930 when
the overhead trade was made public and fell to Y490 by the end of the
year. This is a typical example of insider trading and "B" 's behavior
was inexcusable.
These incidents are just the tip of the iceberg. In many instances,
insider trading was suspected, but no formal accusations were made. In
order to effectively regulate insider trading, it is necessary to reconsider
the requisite conditions and the contents of the penal regulations under
the current law. Furthermore, regulation of insider trading needs to ex-
tend beyond the current coverage of listed stocks to cover over-the-
counter stocks as well.
I. PROHIBITION OF PRICE MANIPULATION
Like insider trading, the problem of price manipulation has gone
largely unregulated. Although there are regulations preventing price ma-
nipulation (Securities and Exchange Act sections 125(1) and (2), and
1. In another situation, the Ministry of Finance's investigation of whether there was
insider trading at the time of the merger of Taiyo Kobe Bank and Mitsui Bank only considered
trading conducted after the Board of Directors' decision. The investigation excluded trading
that occurred between the agreement of the heads of both banks to proceed with the merger
and the Board of Directors' decision. Actually, stock prices rose somewhat before the Board's
decision was made.
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197(2)), in practice these regulations have rarely been applied because the
conditions necessary for the prohibition of price manipulation under sec-
tions 125(1) and (2) are too vague. Furthermore, the rules are difficult to
apply. Rather than eliminating the provisions, however, it is appropriate
to reform them. These types of reforms have rarely been made in the
past, largely due to the reluctance of administrative authorities. Re-
cently, an attempt at reform was made, but ultimately failed because of
political objections.
By contrast, the penal provisions against price manipulation have
been applied in a number of instances. In this respect, price manipula-
tion is controlled more effectively than insider trading. Some examples
are the Tokyo Shoken Kinyu company incident (Tokyo Court December
7, 1981, judicial precedent no. 1048 item 164) and the Kyodo Shiryou
K.K. incident (Tokyo High Court July 2, 1988, High Court vol. 41 no.2
item 269, original judgment July 31, 1984, judicial precedent review no.
1138 item 26). However, in the case of the Kyodo Shiryou incident, in
which the appeal trial judgement on price manipulation was handed
down in 1988, the Ministry of Finance Securities Bureau originally inves-
tigated the Kyodo Shiryou and the securities firm based on a suspicion of
fluctuation control. The investigation did not result in an indictment. In
another case, the defendant Otani Mitsuhiro, who represented the stock
speculation group "Koutsuu," was prosecuted in the Tokyo Court in
1990 for controlling prices of Fujita Kankou stocks.
Current laws prohibiting price manipulation apply only to the secur-
ities listed on the stock exchange. As with insider trading, legislation
should be extended to cover the over-the-counter market as well.
IV. PROHIBITION OF LOSS COMPENSATION
Similar to the regulations dealing with insider trading and price ma-
nipulation, the 1991 legal reforms prohibiting loss compensation also in-
clude penal sanctions for violations. At the time of the 1960 reform,
section 50 was instituted, providing that securities finns or their directors
or employees may not take specific actions. Section 50 was directed at
the relatively frequent incidents of impropriety between the securities
firms and their customers. However, because it was undesirable and, in
fact, impossible for the law to address every type of possible abuse, a
degree of discretion was left to the Ministry of Finance. Consequently,
when the problem of loss compensation arose, which could not be pro-
hibited by notification, it could be prohibited by the reform of ministerial
orders. Perhaps this might be a sufficient means of handling legal re-
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form. However, under this makeshift system of prohibition by notifica-
tion, deeds performed in disregard of a notification are often ignored by
the Ministry of Finance. Technically, loss compensation is prohibited,
and securities firms that provide loss compensation and their customers
who accept it can be punished (sections 20(2), 199 (1)-(5), 200 (3)(3)).
However, the punishments for violator companies and customers are too
light.2
V. STRENGTHENING THE MONITORING SYSTEM
The above circumstances make it necessary to establish an effective
system to monitor securities dealings. Former Prime Minister Kaifu di-
rected the provisional administration reform commission (hereinafter
Koukakushin) to develop such policies, including the establishment of an
independent monitoring organization. It was foreseeable that these steps
would result at best with something resembling the National Tax Admin-
istration Agency.3 Nevertheless, the report of the Koukakushin estab-
lished a Securities and Financial Inspection Committee based on section
8 of the Administrative Organization Law, which dealt with monitoring
securities and financial trading. The final report was not as strict as the
original proposal, however, because the Ministry of Finance feared that a
more stringent report would reduce its power.
The Securities and Financial Inspection Committee of the
Gyoukakushin (the current name of the committee that monitors securi-
ties trading) monitors malfeasance in the securities and financial markets,
mandates compulsory investigations by authorities, makes recommenda-
tions for administrative disposition by the Ministry of Finance, and has
jurisdiction over routine investigations. The Committee can make tenta-
tive evaluations, but the Ministry of Finance still has investigative au-
thority. The Committee does not have punitive authority and is not a
completely independent organization. In these respects, the Committee
is insufficient. Additionally, because the report itself leaves many of the
finer points undefined, it is necessary to await future legislative action in
order to truly evaluate the Committee. Currently, the Ministry of Fi-
nance is also proceeding with organizational reform.
2. Violators face less than a year in prison or a fine of less than Y 1 million. Customers
face less than six months in prison or a fine of less than V500,000, and then only if they have
demanded the loss compensation from their brokers. Thus, customers are not punished at all
if their brokers voluntarily provided loss compensation.
3. Japan's National Tax Administration Agency is an extra-ministerial department of
the Ministry of Finance and is not an independent body.
1993]
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VI. PREVENTING SECURITIES MALFEASANCE
Although the monitoring organization wields some strength
through the licensing system, the Gyoukakushin committee is not power-
ful enough by itself. As the numerous securities scandals make clear, the
source of the problem is the so-called convoy licensing system. In order
to completely prevent securities malfeasance, a committee that is in-
dependent from the Ministry of Finance must be established. The poten-
tial establishment of an organization like the SEC has been criticized,
because many believe that the current licensing system of the securities
industry and an organization like the SEC cannot coexist. A second look
at the licensing system to investigate whether or not it can coexist with
an organization like the SEC is presently being urged. Ideally, the door
to the securities industry can be opened wide by an advance registration
system, under which securities firms can compete freely, advantages can
be retained, and disadvantages can be reduced. Unfortunately, the use of
a licensing system at the time of the 1960 reform restricted the freedom
to commence business. Considering the circumstances at the time, au-
tonomous control was not appropriate, and the use of a licensing system
was a step in the right direction. However, given the modem conditions
of securities trading, the licensing system is no longer sufficient. The
Ministry of Finance authorities should be barred from excessive interfer-
ence. Currently, the Ministry of Finance tends to honor licenses that
have been issued and is reluctant to punish licensed securities firms for
fear that punishment will lead to problems of deteriorating financial re-
sources in the future. This fear is somewhat justified, particularly in the
case of loss compensation. Although purposeful supervision regulations
are provided, in practice they are not well applied.
A powerful independent organization like the SEC is necessary in
order to regulate securities firms and other participants in the securities
world so as to best protect public investors. This independent organiza-
tion should be able to monitor the stock market and take preventive
measures to nip any detected securities malfeasance in the bud before it
becomes serious.
Today, internationalization is promoted in many areas. Since the
securities monitoring system is one such area, uniformity of the securities
monitoring mechanism of each country is necessary. The current Japa-
nese monitoring system, which only serves to protect vested interests,
will impede the integration of Japanese securities into the emerging inter-
national market and make it difficult for foreigners to take Japanese regu-
latory agencies and securities firms seriously.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As the Japanese securities market becomes integrated into the
emerging international market, outside pressures from the United States
authorities and the United States securities market will help encourage
reforms. However, a strong, independent organization like the SEC must
be formed in order to ensure fairness in Japanese securities trading and to
protect the interests of investors.

